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Introduction: State Capacity and Elections in the Study of 
Authoritarian Regimes 
 
Abstract 
Studies of multiparty elections in authoritarian regimes have proliferated in recent years. 
Nevertheless, the available evidence remains inconclusive in terms of when, where, or why elections 
work to sustain or undermine authoritarian rule. The contributions to the special issue “State Capacity, 
Elections and the Resilience of Authoritarian Rule” argue that analyzing the extent to which the effect of 
elections on authoritarian regime resilience is mediated through the factor of state capacity helps to solve 
this puzzle. This introduction lays the analytical foundation for this discussion by reviewing key terms and 
concepts, and by highlighting possible theoretical connections between the state capacity literature on the 
one hand and the electoral authoritarianism literature on the other. Furthermore, it considers the 
contributions in this special issue, and points out areas of agreement and disagreement between the 
authors, while simultaneously placing the different arguments within the broader field of enquiry. 
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Introduction 
The end of the “third wave” of democratization and the proliferation of electoral authoritarianism has 
sparked a shift in scholarly attention from the study of democratization to the origins, designs and 
outcomes of multiparty elections in authoritarian regimes. Nonetheless, the available evidence is not yet 
conclusive in terms of when, where, or why elections work to sustain or undermine authoritarian rule. In 
particular, scholars have, so far, largely ignored the question of the extent to which the effect of elections 
on authoritarian regime resilience is mediated through the factor of the state. This is surprising in so far as 
the state is one of the key concepts in the study of comparative politics. The special issue “State 
Capacity, Elections and the Resilience of Authoritarian Rule” addresses this gap in the literature through 
a comprehensive discussion that features conceptual, quantitative, and qualitative contributions. The 
discussion revolves around a very specific question: how do institutional properties of the state capacity 
affect the impact of multiparty elections on the resilience of authoritarian rule? While the contributions in 
this special issue acknowledge that the causal relationship between state capacity and electoral 
authoritarianism flows in both directions, the thrust of the studies in this special issue is that elections are 
more likely to stabilize authoritarian regimes endowed with high levels of state capacity. On the other 
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hand, where state capacity is low, elections are more likely to spin out of control, forcing the regime to 
turn to more blatant forms of fraud or large-scale violence, which tend to cause regime destabilization. 
Thus, elections are more likely to stabilize authoritarian regimes endowed with high levels of state 
capacity. On the other hand, where state capacity is low, elections are more likely to spin out of control, 
forcing the regime to turn to more blatant forms of fraud or large-scale violence, which tend to cause 
regime destabilization. Yet different dimensions of state capacity – namely, its extractive, coercive, and 
administrative subcomponents – are used in very different ways to maintain an electoral regime’s stability 
and access to power. Whether and how high levels of state capacity exert a stabilizing effect on 
authoritarian rule depends on the policy goals for which the state is used.  
 Historically, “hybrid regimes” (Diamond, 2002) or “electoral authoritarianism” (Schedler, 2006) – 
concepts that denote regimes that engage in multiparty politics while maintaining their claims to power – 
are not a new phenomenon (Miller, 2015; Skaaning et al., 2015). Nonetheless, the Autocracies of the 
World Dataset (Magaloni, Chu and Min 2013) shows that regimes “in which a ruling party allows 
opposition groups to form parties and participate in elections and the legislature”, in which politics “are 
highly biased in favor of the ruling party, but competition is real” and in which “parties other than the ruling 
one have representation in the parliament” (Magaloni 2008: 732) have dramatically increased in number 
in recent years (cf. Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Number and frequency of multiparty autocracies in the world, 1950-2012 
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 Source: Magaloni et al., 2013. 
 
 The recent and global nature of this development has sparked a shift in scholarly attention from 
the study of democratization to the origins and designs of multiparty elections in authoritarian regimes as 
well as the impact of these on regime resilience. Nonetheless, as an emerging literature has begun to 
point out, the available evidence is not yet conclusive in terms of when, where, or why elections work to 
sustain or undermine authoritarian rule (Boogards, 2013; Edgell et al., 2015). In fact, both supporters and 
opponents of the “democratization by election” thesis (Lindberg, 2009) suggest that multiparty elections 
will affect – positively or negatively – the stability and survival of autocratic regimes, depending on the 
context. Scholars have highlighted, inter alia, the importance of the international setting (Levitsky and 
Way, 2010; Bunce and Wolchik, 2011), the level of economic development (Blaydes, 2011), the specific 
design of electoral institutions (Lust-Okar, 2006), divergent patterns of party building (Morse, 2014) and 
regime party institutionalization (Magaloni, 2008), domestic threat levels (Gandhi, 2008), and the 
cohesiveness of elite coalitions, as well as the role of opposition tactics and tactical emulation through 
mechanisms of diffusion (Bunce and Wolchik, 2011; Donno, 2013). 
However relatively little research has focused on the potential link between state capacity, 
elections, and the resilience of authoritarian rule. While the association between the strength of state 
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capacity and the survival of democracy is by now a well-established research field (Moller and Skaaning, 
2014; Carbone and Memoli, 2015), and a number of quantitative (Andersen et al., 2014; Seeberg, 2014) 
and qualitative (Slater, 2008; Way, 2005; Levitsky and Way, 2010) studies hint at a positive link between 
state capacity and autocratic regime stability, the relationship between state capacity and electoral 
authoritarianism remains largely unexplored.  
Building on these literatures, the first and most distinctive aim of the contributions in this special 
issue is the attempt to apply the concept of state capacity to study the impact of multiparty elections on 
the resilience of authoritarian rule. Certainly, the concept of state capacity might also be useful to 
understand the survival or failure of dictatorships that do not hold regular multiparty elections. Yet, this 
special issue aims specifically at the ongoing debate in comparative politics about the relationship 
between elections and authoritarian resilience. A second distinctive feature of this collection is that each 
article examines a unique aspect of the relationship between state capacity, elections, and the political 
outcomes that ensue. A third one lies in the diversity of methods and data selection. While the use of 
comparative research strategies is a unifying theme across the articles, some of the contributions apply 
quantitative methods of cross-national, cross-area comparative research, whereas others follow the case 
study method or present paired comparisons of crucial cases in different world regions, including East 
and Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and the post-Soviet world.  
This introduction will first review existing conceptualizations of electoral autocracies, and the 
literature on the purposes and effects of multiparty elections in authoritarian regimes, followed by a 
discussion of the existing state capacity literature. Finally, we consider the contributions in this issue and 
point out areas of agreement and disagreement between the authors, while simultaneously linking their 
arguments to the broader field of enquiry.  
 
Purposes and effects of multiparty elections in authoritarian regimes 
As reflected in Figure 1, authoritarian regimes that allow for multiparty elections have existed for more 
than a century, but their number and relative frequency have increased substantially since the end of the 
Cold War, from 16 in 1988 to 47 in 2012. Hence, regimes in which politics are biased against the 
opposition, but electoral competition is real and parties other than the ruling party are represented in the 
legislature, now constitute the most common type of non-democratic regime. In contrast to other 
approaches in comparative politics, which conceptualize regimes that are “neither fully democratic nor 
classic authoritarian” (Boogards, 2009) as diminished subtypes of democracy (Merkel 2004) or as “hybrid 
regimes” (Diamond, 2002; Levitsky and Way 2010), the unifying approach across the contributions in this 
volume is different. Following the conceptual strategy proposed by Schedler and others (Schedler, 2006, 
2015; Howard and Roessler, 2006; Lindberg 2006, 2009; Brownlee, 2009; Boogards 2009; Edgell et al., 
2015), we conceptualize authoritarian regimes that allow for multiparty elections for legislatures (and the 
executive) in which opposition parties can compete – even though “governments deploy a broad 
repertoire of manipulative strategies to keep winning elections” (Schedler, 2015: 1) – as a specific 
  6 
 
subtype of authoritarian rule (not a third, hybrid, category of regimes). Hence, we draw a line between 
authoritarian regimes that do allow for (limited) multiparty competition in elections (often labeled as 
“electoral authoritarianism”) and those dictatorships in which political parties are banned or only the ruling 
party is allowed to file candidates for parliament, and in which the entire legislature is composed of non-
party representatives or members of the ruling party (“closed authoritarianism”; Magaloni, 2008; Brownlee 
2009; Schedler, 2015). Multiparty authoritarianism allows for at least limited multiparty competition and 
some form of party opposition without renouncing the regime’s dictatorial claim. The difference between 
multiparty elections in authoritarian regimes compared to those in democracies is that in electoral 
autocracies the “playing field” is not level (or at least less level as under democracy), and the defeat of 
the incumbent, although not excluded in principle, is far less likely. As such, elections are not meant to 
bring forth a new political majority, but rather confirm the status quo (cf. Edgell et al., 2015: 5).  
Most contemporary research on multiparty elections under authoritarian rule falls into two broad 
categories: 1) studies that focus on the purpose of adopting nominally democratic elements such as 
elections, political parties, and legislatures; and 2) studies that address the effects of elections on 
autocratic regime duration and resulting prospects for democratization (cf. Hanson in this issue). 
 
Purpose of adopting multiparty elections in autocratic regimes 
Any explanation of the functions and effects of multiparty electoral authoritarianism must take into 
account the specific historical contexts in which they emerged. As Miller (2015) has shown, multiparty 
electoral authoritarianism appeared first in Europe and North America, but from the 1880s until the 
interwar period, it became primarily a Latin American phenomenon. The spread of democratic norms 
during the interwar period and the end of colonialism following World War II led many post-colonial 
nations in Africa and Asia to adopt the electoral procedures of their former colonizers, albeit only with 
limited or uncompetitive elections (Linz, 2000; Miller, 2015). Today, however, these regimes are 
particularly common in the post-communist region and in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, where the rise of 
electoral authoritarianism since 1990 is mostly a liberalizing outcome of stalled or interrupted transitions 
from one-party authoritarianism (Wahman, 2014). 
 
Figure 2: Shifting regional trajectories of multiparty autocracies, 1950-2012 
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Source: Magaloni et al., 2013. 
 
In addition to the role of inherited colonial institutions, many scholars have also provided theoretical 
arguments as to why autocrats might adopt multiparty elections. Schedler (2006) was among the first to 
point out that holding elections may legitimize regimes without much risk of relinquishing office. Similarly, 
Levitsky and Way (2010) and Shirah (2014) argue that in the post-Cold War period dictators might want 
to hold elections in order to gain international legitimacy or satisfy the requirements of international aid 
organizations, especially when their economies are strongly linked to Western democracies. Other 
scholars highlight the power-sharing role of authoritarian elections and the informational benefits of 
multiparty elections under autocratic rule (Magaloni, 2008; Gandhi, 2008). That is, multiparty elections 
can be used as tools to communicate regime dominance, monitor subaltern regime elites, and distribute 
patronage to loyal elites and citizens (Lust-Okar, 2006; Blaydes, 2011; Morgenbesser, 2014). Finally, 
Miller (2015) argues that autocratic elections serve to channel popular demands, ascertain citizen 
preferences, and provide autocrats with information that is necessary to develop new policies and to 
recalibrate already existing ones.  
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The effects of multiparty elections on authoritarian regime resilience 
Scholars have also become increasingly interested in understanding the conditions under which elections 
contribute to democratization. On the one hand, the democratization-by-elections school argues that 
repeated elections in authoritarian contexts will eventually lead to the breakdown of autocratic rule and 
the emergence of a genuinely democratic space (e.g. Lindberg, 2006, 2009; Donno, 2013). For instance, 
Miller (2015) recently showed that experience with autocratic elections is a positive predictor of 
democratization and democratic stability. Howard and Roessler (2006) find that multiparty elections under 
authoritarian conditions can likely turn into liberalizing junctures when, during periods of more intensive 
popular protests against authoritarian incumbents, the opposition unifies to contest elections. Moreover, 
experience with multiparty elections can provide elites with incentives to invest in party-building, thereby 
effectively institutionalizing a greater number of politically relevant cleavages, which, in turn, means that 
social conflicts are channeled into the electoral system. This reduces the risk of democratic failure after a 
transition from authoritarianism towards democracy (Shirah, 2014). Similarly, Morse (2014) argues that 
the opening of major offices for contestation under authoritarianism changes the incentives that 
opposition parties face and provides them with additional focal points for contestation, which might 
contribute to democratization. Lastly, Edgell et al. (2015: 12) emphasize socialization and experiential 
learning as mechanisms through which de jure multiparty elections have a positive effect on 
democratization and democratic survival. 
On the other hand, several other studies find no effect of multi-party electoral histories on the 
likelihood of transitions to democracy or challenge the validity of the proposed causal mechanisms. For 
example, Boogards’ (2013) re-evaluation of Lindberg’s (2006) original data questions the latter’s findings 
for Sub-Saharan Africa, whereas McCoy and Hartlyn (2009) and Kaya and Bernhard (2013) find no effect 
of authoritarian elections on democracy in Latin America and the post-Soviet republics. In fact, there 
seems to be an emerging consensus among researchers of elections in authoritarian regimes that 
multiparty elections can have both regime-sustaining and regime-subverting consequences, and that 
there is no clear cross-regional effect of elections on regime stability. For example, a recent study by 
Edgell et al. (2015) finds strong evidence for a positive effect of regular multiparty elections in 
authoritarian regimes on democratization at the global level, but also important cross-regional and 
temporal differences: the effect is much stronger for the “third wave” of democratization – and especially 
the post-Cold War period – than for earlier time periods (Edgell et al., 2015: 16). Sub-Saharan Africa and 
post-communist states seem to account for the bulk of the global effect, while in Latin America this effect 
is only significant for the “third wave” era. Lastly, the results for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
are more ambiguous, while authoritarianism in Asia seems to be largely immune against the 
democratizing effect of multiparty elections (Edgell et al., 2015: 21). Given that the political landscape in 
East and Southeast Asia, compared to other parts of the world, features relatively strong states 
(Fukuyama, 2014), and that autocratic regimes in the MENA region often maintain absurdly 
overdeveloped security apparatuses – indicating that these states possess high levels of “repressive 
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capacity” (Springborg, 2016) – a likely reason for these geographically differentiated findings could be the 
factor that sits at the center of this special issue: state capacity. 
 
 
Conceptualizing state capacity  
In order to gain a better understanding of how state capacity and its constituent dimensions affect 
authoritarian electoral stability, one must first address the conceptual and theoretical challenges that 
accompany the concept of state capacity (see Hanson in this issue). While there is a well established and 
rich literature in the social sciences on how the state should be defined, the concept of state capacity is of 
more recent origin and is more contested. It acquired centrality in political science during the 1970s and 
1980s, when scholars first attempted to bring the state back into the study of newly developing 
economies (Evans et al., 1985) and, later on, aimed at linking state capacity to different outcomes in 
economic development, international security and stability, social welfare and public service provision, 
and democratic consolidation (Andersen et al., 2014).  
Although fundamentally shaped by a Weberian understanding of the state as a set of public 
institutions and other public organizations that, together, define the legitimate control, use, and 
distribution of power over a given sovereign territory and people (Evans et al. 1985), existing studies differ 
on what exactly constitutes state capacity. In fact, the term has been used across a variety of disciplines 
to refer to everything from the general capacity of a state to accomplish its goals, to providing public 
services, and to the very specific and largely physical capacity of a state such as building roads. In an 
attempt to avoid amorphousness and imprecision, the contributions in this special issue share the 
common understanding that “state capacity” concerns specifically the ability of state institutions to 
implement official goals and policies (Skocpol, 1985: 8). Even though there is a broad range of 
dimensions that have been proposed to differentiate and measure a state’s capacity to “get things done,” 
scholars typically focus on three dimensions (Hanson and Sigman, 2013; Møller and Skaaning, 2014) 
which, together, constitute a “least common denominator” in the understanding of this multidimensional 
concept (for more detail, see Hanson’s article in this special issue): (1) a state’s coercive capacity; (2) a 
state’s administrative capacity; and (3) a state’s extractive capacity.  
Coercive capacity refers to the state’s ability to maintain a monopoly over the legitimate use of 
force, including both the ability to maintain order within the borders of the state and to defend the territory 
against external threats. As Fukuyama (2014: 1329) points out, coercive capacity is not a “binary, on-off 
condition” (see also Albertus and Menaldo, 2012). Instead, the extent to which a state is able to provide 
security to its population can be measured as a continuous variable that ranges from near-absolute 
security to the complete breakdown of state authority.  
Similarly, administrative capacity is a scalar concept, indicating the degree to which state 
agencies are governed by meritocratic recruitment and formally institutionalized rules, rather than by 
forms of particularism such as corruption, clientelism, nepotism, cronyism, or patronage. Finally, the third 
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type of state capacity is the ability of the state to raise revenues (extractive capacity). As Hanson (in this 
special issue) notes, extractive capacity “is not only essential for funding state activities of all types, but it 
serves as a marker for the capabilities that underlie state power.” Hence, it is analytically distinct from the 
other two capacities but, at the same time, depends on and is affected by the state’s capability to coerce 
subjects into paying taxes as well as regulate the social and economic spheres.  
Of course, the territorial dimension of state capacity should be mentioned. Quantitative, cross-
national studies lack the necessary data to capture subnational variation in state capacity, although the 
qualitative state building literature provides plenty of evidence for important subnational and sectoral 
variation within a given country (Soifer and vom Hau, 2008; Koehler and Ufen in this special issue). 
Despite laudable efforts to create better measurements and data, scaling down from the national to the 
subnational level in order to identify differences in state capacity at the local level, which would then 
permit making statistical inferences on the relationship between state capacity, elections and authoritarian 
resilience on the subnational level, remains an unsolved problem.  
 
 
State capacity and elections in authoritarian regimes  
The causal relationship between state capacity and electoral authoritarianism flows in both directions. 
That is, the different dimensions of state capacity “both affect, and are affected by, the strategies that 
authoritarian regimes use to maintain power” (Hanson in this special issue). In the same vein, elections 
can strengthen or weaken the state. Slater (2008) argues that the organization and holding of multiparty 
elections under non-democratic conditions can have a direct state-building effect. Specifically, not only do 
elections act as catalysts for the construction of mass ruling parties and the capture of previously 
marginal and peripheral populations, but they also enable government interventions in local power 
enclaves. In this way, “competitive national elections (…) incite the territorial extension of state 
institutions” (Slater, 2008). Yet, competitive elections can also subvert state capacity and contribute to 
state collapse. According to Mansfield and Snyder (2005), the opening of the electoral arena for 
contestation at the subnational level in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia spawned centrifugal forces in the 
regions that weakened central governments and ultimately undermined their authoritarian regimes. 
Moreover, in the case of complex multinational states, what is often at stake in elections is not merely 
regime survival but also state survival in the face of pressures for disintegration, including challenges by 
secessionist movements. 
The focus of the contributions of this special issue, however, lies above all on the question of 
whether and how state capacity influences the regime-strengthening or regime-weakening effects of 
elections. As Fenner and Slater (2011: 17) assert, “states are the ultimate institutional weapons in the 
authoritarian arsenal.” Hence, conventional wisdom holds that strong states strengthen authoritarian 
regimes, whereas state weakness amplifies the regime-subverting impact of elections in authoritarian 
regimes. Autocrats presiding over a highly capable state may abuse the bureaucracy to subtly manipulate 
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voters and the electoral framework. Moreover, a strong coercive apparatus serves to prevent opposition 
mobilization and post-electoral protests (Seeberg, 2014). Thus, elections are more likely to stabilize 
authoritarian regimes endowed with high levels of state capacity. On the other hand, where state capacity 
is low, elections are more likely to spin out of control, forcing the regime to turn to more blatant forms of 
fraud or large-scale violence, which tend to cause regime destabilization. Furthermore, studies of 
authoritarian state-building in post-Soviet countries suggest that state weakness strengthens electoral 
competition in authoritarian regimes, as regime elites in the provinces have little interest in building strong 
political parties or strengthening political party penetration. This, in turn, makes it more difficult for rulers 
to increase state integration and capacity (Way, 2005; Linz and Stepan, 1996). Yet, while the findings of 
Andersen et al. (2014) show that state capacity does indeed tend to enhance autocratic regime stability, 
their analysis also reveals that what primarily matters is coercive capacity, not administrative 
effectiveness (see also Albertus and Menaldo, 2012). 
As reflected in Figure 2, different types of political regimes exhibit different degrees of state 
capacity. Based on the regime data provided by Magaloni et al. (2013, see Figure 1) and state capacity 
data collected by Hanson and Sigman (2013; for more detail, see Hanson in this special issue), it seems 
that average state capacity has increased across regime types since the 1960s. However, multiparty 
autocracies are clearly inferior in terms of their state capacity compared to most other regime types.  
 
Figure 3: State capacity and regime types, 1960s and 2009 
 
 
  12 
 
 
Note: Regime data are from Magaloni et al. (2013); state capacity is the value of the capacity1 
measure developed by Hanson and Sigman (2013) in their State Capacity Dataset, version 0.95. For 
more detail on how the (composite) measure of state capacity is constructed, see the article by Hanson in 
this special issue..  
 
For lack of space, we omit an in-depth discussion of the theoretically intriguing variation of state 
capacity across regime types. However, it is not terribly surprising that monarchies tend to have stronger 
state capacity than other types of authoritarian regimes, as most of the surviving royal dictatorships (as of 
2009) are oil monarchies in the Near and Middle East, who use their vast rents to invest in strong security 
apparatuses and relatively well-functioning state bureaucracies. Furthermore, most single party regimes 
can be found either in Asia, where strong (developmental) states are relatively common for historical 
reasons (see Woo-Cummings, 1999), or post-conflict regimes in Sub-Sahara Africa, such as Rwanda and 
Uganda, which are often cited as prime examples of African developmental states. In contrast, the 
category of multiparty regimes is much more diverse in terms of state capacity: the range is by far the 
largest in terms of outliers at the top (regimes with particularly strong state capacity) and also 
considerable in terms of outliers at the bottom-end of the range (particularly weak state capacity). 
While statistical analysis is the most appropriate approach to analyze “typical” cases of state 
capacity in electoral authoritarian regimes (those lying within the boxes), a qualitative case study 
approach might be more appropriate to deal with the outliers – such as pre-1988 South Korea and 
contemporary Malaysia. Moreover, the relationship between state capacity and regime stability is not 
static but can evolve over the course of time, with the two elements either mutually reinforcing or 
undermining each other (Hanson in this special issue). Autocracies with strong state capacity such as 
South Korea (Hellmann in this issue) face a dilemma: on the one hand, high state capacity enables 
industrialization, which, in turn, strengthens the regime through the causal mechanisms of legitimation 
and cooptation. On the other hand, the social and cultural consequences of economic growth undermine 
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the structural foundations of authoritarian rule, as modernization shifts the traditional support structures 
away from small farmers and rural populations in favor of industrial workers and the urban middle class. 
In such a scenario, high levels of state capacity are associated with increasing socio-economic 
development and resurrecting civil societies. That is, strong state capacity can make autocracies strong in 
the short to medium term, but can also contribute indirectly to the erosion of autocratic rule in the long-
term. 
 
The contributions to this issue 
Addressing the gaps in the literature mentioned above requires a multi-method approach, which is why 
this special issue brings together conceptual, quantitative, and qualitative contributions concerning the 
link between state capacity and the stability of electoral authoritarian regimes. Using diverse 
methodological approaches and a wealth of data to make their cases, the articles collectively attempt to 
link debates among three different subfields of comparative politics: state-building research, 
authoritarianism studies, and the wider impact of elections on regime survival or breakdown. In doing so, 
the articles cover the geographic regions of East Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and the Middle 
East, and the post-Soviet region. While the special issue mostly focuses on contemporary cases, it also 
includes historical cases of electoral authoritarianism – namely, South Korea and Indonesia, which 
constitute the statistical outliers that combine relatively high-capacity state with a weak electoral 
authoritarian regime. 
The first contribution, by Jon Hanson, discusses various approaches to the conceptualization and 
measurement of the institutional underpinnings of autocratic power. His theoretical inquiry into how state 
capacity influences the organization of authoritarian rule and the strategies used for regime survival 
suggests that different dimensions of state capacity – namely, its extractive, coercive, and administrative 
subcomponents – are used in very different ways to maintain an electoral regime’s stability and access to 
power. Hanson argues that “vertical” threats from below can best be combated through administrative 
capacity and coercive capabilities, whereas “horizontal” intra-elite pressures are most effectively quelled 
through extractive and coercive capacities. By focusing more specifically on the constitutive parts of state 
capacity and outlining the various approaches that have been taken to measure them, Hanson 
demonstrates how the sub-facets of state capacity can affect electoral regime resilience in different ways. 
Moreover, by outlining a two-way causal relationship between state capacity and regime strategies aimed 
at maintaining power, Hanson clarifies some of the analytical problems that emerge when distinguishing 
the two. 
The next two contributions examine how elections work to destabilize autocracies and what the 
impact is of regular multiparty elections on democratization. Merete Seeberg approaches these questions 
from an economic perspective and suggests that a dictator’s control over the country’s economy may be 
crucial for understanding the complex relationship between autocracy, elections, and regime change. 
More specifically, she theorizes that an incumbent’s control over the economy decreases the likelihood 
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that elections will cause regime breakdown, as economic control provides crucial coercive and 
manipulative resources. Such resources allow for various forms of electoral manipulation and, as such, 
economic control is converted into electoral control. In order to test these claims, Seeberg conducts a 
regression analysis of autocracies with and without elections from 1970-2006, supplemented by in-depth 
knowledge of a number of case studies, including Mexico, Russia, Egypt, Malaysia, Zimbabwe and 
Belarus. Her focus on the power relationship between rulers and their economic institutions not only 
indicates how economic control – through the institutional apparatus of the state – can be used to 
stabilize a regime but also contributes to our understanding of how the stability of electoral autocracies 
and non-electoral autocracies may differ.   
The contribution by van Ham and Zimmermann addresses how state capacity not only affects 
electoral authoritarianism and its stability but also the consolidation of democratic systems that may follow 
the breakdown of electoral authoritarianism. Drawing on a sample of 547 national-level executive 
elections in 112 electoral authoritarian regimes from 1974 to 2012, their statistical analysis indicates that 
strong state capacity is negatively associated with both democratic change and the likelihood of 
incumbent turnover. Perhaps most importantly, van Ham and Zimmerman find that, although a lack of 
state capacity increases incumbent turnover, it also has the adverse effect of rendering the resulting 
turnover less sustainable compared to countries with strong state capacity and incumbent turnover. Thus, 
what may be needed for democratic change after elections to be successful is the (unlikely) combination 
of strong states and incumbent turnover in elections.  
Shifting from statistical analyses to case studies, the next three articles analyze different cases of 
electoral authoritarianism in East and Southeast Asia. First, Olli Hellmann examines the case of electoral 
authoritarianism in South Korea from 1963 to 1987. Combining insights from the literatures on the 
developmental state, electoral authoritarianism, and the stability of autocratic regimes, he contends that 
although high capacity states have more strategic options and resources available compared to low 
capacity states, regime stability is a function of how this state capacity is used and not the mere presence 
of it. Through a historical comparative analysis of various stages of regime and state-building in South 
Korea, his case study thus contributes to the debate on how state capacity and regime stability determine 
each other. In line with previous findings on state-building and authoritarian rule in East Asia, he 
concludes that whether high levels of state capacity exert a stabilizing effect on authoritarian rule 
depends on the policy goals for which the state is used.  
Marcus Mietzner’s examination of autocratic rule in Indonesia under Suharto from 1965 to 1998 
also demonstrates that well-developed state capacity can prove futile in the fight for political and 
authoritative hegemony. Mietzner argues that the impact of state capacity on the stability of electoral 
authoritarianism may depend not only on the specific type of capacity that is considered, but also on the 
development phase in which the regime finds itself. For example, although coercion can engender a 
strong authoritarian regime, it does not necessarily guarantee its long-term survival. This is especially true 
of regimes that transition from a military to a civilian dictatorship, as such a transition relies on elite 
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support that cannot be garnered only through coercive measures. Instead, at later stages of regime 
development, Suharto used extractive capacities and economic development to sustain his regime. 
Legitimation based on socio-economic performance and elite cooptation stabilized Indonesia’s electoral 
authoritarianism by, inter alia, generating electoral support. However, when the Asian financial crisis of 
1997 hit, elites and masses considered the “authoritarian contract” broken. It is for this reason that 
Suharto, although still in possession of a structurally strong state, fell in the wake of a popular uprising. 
Hence, Mietzner's contribution is significant in at least three ways. First, it makes a convincing case that 
state capacity should not only be disaggregated into its key dimensions, but also into key phases of 
regime consolidation. Second, the case of Indonesia casts a new light on the relationship between state 
capacity and the functions that create and sustain it. Third, the case study exemplifies that resounding 
electoral victories do not necessarily guarantee a regime’s endurance. 
Finally, Andreas Ufen’s study of Malaysia, one of the most durable electoral authoritarian regimes 
worldwide, also shows that strong state capacities alone do not sufficiently explain the resilience of such 
regimes. As previously mentioned, high state capacity levels can contribute to socio-economic 
development, stronger civil societies, and improved political opportunities for opposition. Although state 
capacity and regime capacity are closely interconnected, and a rise in state capacity is usually associated 
with strengthened elite cohesion, in cases where state capacity is high, but regime capacity is decreasing, 
the probability of authoritarian breakdown can rise. In this regard, Ufen’s national and subnational-level 
analyses show how, in spite of high and rising state capacities, opposition coalitions have destabilized 
Malaysia’s electoral authoritarianism at the federal level, and won in states such as Penang and 
Selangor. Yet, at the same time, Ufen shows that ruling parties were able to conquer states with relatively 
weak capacities. 
Delving further into the subnational dimensions of state capacity and the organization of 
authoritarian rule, Kevin Koehler’s case study of Egypt demonstrates how state and regime building can 
hinder the construction of strong institutions. The statistical tests of differential effects of state 
administrative capacity on electoral control in the 2005 and 2010 elections illustrate that the ability of 
regime institutions to penetrate society and state capacity can evolve with reference to each other but, at 
the same time, manifest themselves disparately. The case study of Egypt is valuable in this regard 
because it underlines the importance of uniform state capacity and official party mobilization for regime 
resilience. Moreover, the study shows that the emergence of regime and party institutions in Egypt can be 
best understood in the context and process of state growth. It is only from this perspective that one is able 
to decipher how regime and state institutions have co-evolved, as well as what role party organizations 
have played. 
The paired comparison of Tanzania and Cameroon by Yonatan Morse tackles the question of 
why electoral authoritarianism has found such fertile ground in Africa, even though the continent has 
generally been plagued by state weakness. One common answer has highlighted the role of strong ruling 
parties. That is, in the absence of high state capacity and a strong state, highly institutionalized parties 
  16 
 
have filled the void. Yet, Morse’s comparative study of Tanzania and Cameroon shows that ruling parties 
address weak state capacity in different ways, which, in turn, has consequences for the stabilization and 
resilience of their authoritarian regimes. Specifically, in the face of weak state capacity, Tanzania opted 
for a strong ruling party, whereas Cameroon adopted an alternative path of institutional design and 
created a centralized presidency. These choices had significant effects on their respective forms of 
electoral authoritarianism as well as their transitions to multi-partyism. Although neither country can be 
considered fully democratic nor possesses high degrees of freedom or fairness in elections, the transition 
in Tanzania was marked by better managed and more competitive elections, as the structure of the party 
allowed internal grievances and power-sharing struggles to be adequately addressed. In contrast, thanks 
to a centralized presidency, Cameroon experienced continued electoral repression and fraud, as well a 
lack of dispute mechanisms to confront elite resentment and loyalty. The comparison of Tanzania and 
Cameroon thus shows how the organization of ruling parties, in a context of low state capacity, affects 
authoritarian resilience and the transition to multiparty elections. 
In the final contribution to this special issue, David White takes a nuanced look at the relationship 
between stability, electoral authoritarianism, and state capacity in Russia. He argues that autocracies with 
strong regime capacity, although perhaps lacking in state capacity, can, contrary to popular opinion, be 
sustainable over the long-term. By delineating the measures and strategies President and Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin has adopted since 2000 to develop regime capacity, he demonstrates the ways in which 
autocrats can circumvent state building yet, at the same, engage in regime building. His case study, along 
with Hanson’s contribution and Ufen’s investigation of Malaysia, illustrates the difficulties of delineating 
the differences between state and regime and their respective capacities. Together, these contributions 
show that although capacities of regime and state can be conceptually distinct, the two concepts may be 
empirically interwoven. In terms of authoritarian resilience therefore, both regime strength and state 
strength should be considered as having conditioning effects on electoral authoritarianism and its 
resilience. 
 
 
In lieu of a conclusion  
The articles in this issue point to the importance of the concept of state capacity when analyzing the 
“paradox of elections” in authoritarian regimes. While many issues remain partially unresolved, the 
contributions provide evidence that state capacity matters for the resilience of electoral authoritarianism. 
In addition, they point to the necessity of disaggregating the semiabstract notion of state capacity into 
different dimensions or capacities, to differentiate between national and subnational levels of analysis, 
and to observe temporal change. Another key lesson is the importance of the origins of institutions in 
understanding whether institutional effects “are indeed real or if institutions are mere epiphenomena of 
underlying structural processes” (Koehler, in this issue). Finally, while elections do not always have the 
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effects anticipated by autocrats, they can have both positive and negative unintended consequences, as 
is made apparent through strategies of comparative analysis. 
Of course, the contributions in this special issue cannot solve all the theoretical, conceptual, 
methodological, or empirical challenges and issues that concern students of electoral authoritarianism. 
The aim of this special issue is more modest. Clearly, elections differ substantially in their impact on 
regime stability and survival, a fact that is widely acknowledged in the present literature. But electoral 
authoritarian regimes also differ in regard to how autocrats deal with strong capacity states or how they 
react to the challenges of state weakness. However, we believe that this special issue is useful and timely 
because it successfully demonstrates that state capacity matters for regime resilience and therefore also 
matters for the study of multiparty elections in autocracies.  
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